We point out several methodological flaws in previous research that concludes that managers mislead shareholders into selling their stock for too cheap by releasing overly negative information before stock repurchases. In particular, this research relies primarily on measured market reaction to management guidance which suffers from endogeneity concerns. Using a sample of 3,181 repurchase firms and matching rival firms during 2003-2012, we find insignificant differences between their frequencies of management guidance, the implied earnings updates, and the closeness of earnings guidance to actual earnings. In contrast, there is a significant difference in market reaction to guidance, which is 1.5% lower for repurchase firms than for rival firms after accounting for differences in earnings updates and other information.
Introduction
Stock repurchases are currently the leading form of cash returned by US firms to their outside shareholders. Aggregate repurchases by US firms exceeded aggregate dividends for the first time in 1999 (Grullon and Michaely 2002) . More recently, S&P 500 firms paid out $1,828 billion in the form of repurchases during 2011 to 2014, which exceeded $1,278 billion that they paid out in the form of dividends.
1 Given the importance of stock repurchases to capital formation in the economy, it would be a matter of serious concern if the managers of repurchase firms provide voluntary earnings guidance to purposely mislead some of their investors into selling their stock for too cheap. In this paper, we examine a comprehensive sample of stock repurchases during 2003 to 2012 and document evidence that is inconsistent with such a conclusion reached in earlier literature.
Most stock repurchases in recent years have been structured as open market operations. Unlike
dividends, open market repurchases are ad-hoc in nature and carried out at such times as chosen by the firms. The managers usually opt out of repurchases, which means that the value of their own stock and option holdings is linked to the long-run stock prices. Thus, they have an incentive to repurchase stock from outside shareholders at bargain prices. It is reasonable to assume that they can also tell when their stock is likely to be underpriced as shown by previous studies of superior long-term returns after repurchases (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 1995; Peyer and Vermaelen 2009 ) and the timing of repurchases (Ben-Rephael, Oded, and Wohl 2014; Dittmar and Field 2015) . This raises the question of whether managers sometimes actively create such underpricing or whether they only react to underpricing created by other factors. On the one hand, it may be argued that the safe harbor provisions of SEC Rule 10b-8 of 1982 protect managers from litigation related to forward-looking statements and indirectly enable them to mislead investors in the short run. On the other hand, such actions would result in a loss of credibility for managers and raise their cost of capital in the long run (Williams 1996; Hutton and Stocken 2009) . In light of these opposing considerations, we examine whether managers issue misleading earnings guidance just prior to repurchases.
Brockman, Khurana, and Martin (2008) examine stock repurchases during 1994 to 2005 and conclude that managers do not just exploit the market-driven underpricing of their stock from time to time, but that they also actively create such opportunities. In particular, they show that management earnings forecasts (or guidance) are biased downward during a 30-day period before the start of repurchasing but unbiased during a similar period after the end of repurchasing. Thus, they reinforce the evidence of Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008) , who conclude that firms manage earnings to push down their stock prices before repurchases. 2 In this paper, we focus on earnings guidance.
We start by examining the effectiveness of biased earnings guidance before a typical stock repurchase in transferring wealth from selling shareholders to remaining shareholders. Unlike many corporate events (such as equity issues), open market stock repurchases are spread out over a period of several months or years. Even if one biased earnings guidance given before the start of repurchasing lowers the stock price, subsequent earnings announcements should at least partly correct that mispricing.
Assuming that such correction occurs on the corresponding earnings announcement date after the start of repurchasing, we estimate that, in the median case in our sample, the claimed misguidance would have affected less than one percent of outstanding shares that had been repurchased by then. In turn, this would have increased the value of remaining shares by a small fraction of one percent. The only way for managers to cause a more substantial wealth transfer from selling shareholders to holding shareholders would be to provide a sequence of misleading earnings guidance during the length of the repurchase program and then to sustain the deception through a sequence of earnings manipulations. However, such an outcome calls into question the rationality of stock markets and whether the managers would benefit on the whole given the reputational cost of their actions.
To measure the information content of earnings guidance, we follow a procedure similar to the traditional earnings surprise measure. Specifically, we define an EPS update measure as the difference between the EPS (earnings per share) number provided by the managers and the prevailing analyst consensus estimate, all scaled by the stock price. We sometimes refer to this measure simply as update (or EPS update) . Before 2003 the I/B/E/S (Institutional Brokers Estimate System) Guidance database did not include the analyst consensus estimate prevailing at the time of management guidance. Perhaps due to missing such data for a large part of their sample, Brockman, Khurana, and Martin used an alternate measure employed by Cheng and Lo (2006) that measures the content of management guidance by the accompanying market reaction. They find that this market reaction is significantly more negative before stock repurchases than at other times for the same firms and conclude that managers provide overly negative guidance before repurchases. However, this market-reaction based measure introduces a substantial bias into their results. Using regression analysis, we show that the market reaction to repurchase firms for a certain update implied by management guidance is significantly lower than the market reaction to industry and size matched rival firms for an equal update implied by their own management guidance around the same time. This evidence is consistent with Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) who find that repurchases occur in response to market overreaction to other bad news about the firm, and it raises a serious endogeneity concern with using market reaction as the only measure of management guidance and intent in prior research. The market reaction alone cannot tell whether the investor misreaction led to the repurchase or the repurchase motivated the managers to mislead the investors. In comparison, our more direct EPS update measure is not subject to an endogeneity concern, and combined with market returns it suggests that investor misreaction leads to stock repurchases and not that stock repurchases lead to management misguidance.
A careful assessment of EPS updates and market reactions also requires proper benchmarking.
We find that there are strong time trends in the average market reaction to guidance events for all firms in the guidance database, from highly negative returns during 1990s to mildly negative returns during 2000s
and even mildly positive returns during 2009 to 2012. To control for such market-wide trends in guidance and returns as well as industry-specific trends in profitability, forecasts, and investor sentiment, we carefully match each repurchase firm in calendar time with another firm from the same industry that is the closest in firm size. We then compare the EPS updates and the market reactions to guidance events around the same time for repurchase firms and rival firms to establish whether the stock underpricing before repurchases is caused by the managers or the investors. This approach differs considerably from that followed by Brockman, Khurana, and Martin (2008) , who only compare the market reaction to prerepurchase guidance with guidance at other times by the same firms and thus ignore the time trends in guidance and returns.
Finally, we discuss the appropriate length of the pre-repurchase and post-repurchase windows over which we look for evidence on potentially misleading management guidance. Previous literature shows that in a large proportion of cases, the earnings guidance is provided at the same time as an actual earnings announcement (Cheng and Lo 2006; Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman 2008; Acito 2014) . In addition, earnings announcements are the times when investors may reinterpret all previous guidance in view of the actual performance. In short, it is fair to say that earnings announcements are important and mandatory milestones in corporate disclosure. We therefore examine variable-length search windows that start on the last earnings announcement date preceding the repurchase and end on the last calendar day before the first repurchase date. We next carefully construct the parallel search windows for rival firms that are of exactly the same length as the windows for the repurchase firms and, in both cases, start with the respective earnings announcement dates.
Our main results are as follows. In a matched-pairs sample of 3,181 repurchase firms and rival firms during 2003 to 2012, we find that 1,802 repurchase firms and 1,692 rival firms provide one or more management guidance related to future earnings during the pre-repurchase windows. The difference between these frequencies is significant in univariate tests, but becomes insignificant in multivariate tests using a minimum required significance level of 5% (employed throughout this paper). Looking further, repurchase firms are significantly less likely to provide guidance on days other than when they announce actual earnings, or to issue guidance on multiple days during the same pre-repurchase window. Both observations paint a picture of greater restraint on their part. These initial results are inconsistent with the proposition that repurchase firms actively mislead the markets, which would have implied a greater frequency of future guidance, with or without earnings announcements. For further evidence on whether they unreasonably depress prices before repurchases, we examine whether the earnings guidance for repurchase firms is more negative than the earnings guidance for rival firms, and whether it is more negative than the actual earnings announced at a later date.
So we next compare the difference between the management guidance and the prevailing analyst consensus estimate for the repurchase firms and the rival firms. Once again, we find little difference between the updates to their annual or quarterly EPS numbers. There is a very significant difference in the market reactions, however. In cases where guidance about future earnings is provided at the same time as an earnings announcement, the average market-adjusted excess return equals -1.11% for the repurchase firms and 0.48% for the rival firms. These constitute the majority of our cases. Similarly, in the minority of cases where guidance is provided at times other than an earnings announcement, the corresponding excess returns are -1.30% and -0.19%. The difference between returns remains significant in several regressions that control for other cross-sectional determinants, in particular the earnings surprise, and employ different specifications of the determinants. The repurchase firms continue to earn an excess return that is on the order of one to one-and-a-half percent lower than the corresponding return for the rival firms. Overall, given the insignificant difference in guidance updates of repurchase firms and rival firms but the significant difference in their market returns, our evidence suggests market misreaction rather than management misguidance.
We finally examine the difference between the earnings guidance and the corresponding actual earnings announced at a later date to test whether the managers of repurchase firms paint a more pessimistic picture than the managers of rival firms. On average, this difference is significantly negative for both sets of firms, suggesting that managers are generally conservative in their outlook. However, the difference between differences is insignificant, suggesting that the managers of repurchase firms and rival firms are equally conservative, and that their guidance undershoots the actual earnings by similar amounts. We also cannot reject the null hypothesis that the managers of repurchase firms and rival firms are equally accurate in their forecasts based on the absolute value of the difference between the guidance and the actual earnings.
In summary, we find no evidence to suggest that the managers of repurchase firms mislead investors by providing too many or too negative earnings guidance during a pre-announcement period that starts with the last earnings announcement date (an average length of 49 days). Our results should help in alleviating foul-play concerns affecting this dominant form of cash returns from corporations to investors.
We next report a few supplemental tests to confirm our conclusions. First, we compare the EPS updates provided by the repurchase firms during the post-repurchase window with those provided by rival firms at the same time, or those provided by the repurchase firms during the pre-repurchase window. We find no systematic and significant difference between the annual and quarterly EPS updates in either comparison.
In addition, there is no significant difference between the market reactions to repurchase firms and rival firms during the post-repurchase window in the first comparison. However, the market reactions to the same repurchase firms during the post-repurchase and pre-repurchase windows in the second comparison differ by a significant 1.5%. These tests affirm the connection between unreasonably pessimistic market reaction to management guidance events and the initiation of stock repurchases.
Second, we repeat our analysis with an alternate fixed 30-day window before the first repurchase date for both repurchase firms and rival firms as employed by Brockman, Khurana, and Martin (2008) .
This window does not start with an earnings announcement that is a natural marker in corporate disclosure, but it has the advantage that it captures events closer to the actual repurchase. Our main results are similar with this alternate window. The difference between market reactions to EPS guidance of similar magnitude for repurchase firms and rival firms increases to around two percent. This strengthens our conclusion that stock repurchases tend to occur after the investors have been unreasonably pessimistic in their assessment of EPS guidance provided by the managers.
Third, although our main analyses focus on EPS updates provided by management guidance, we also examine updates to annual and quarterly sales and capital expenditures, which are other important information provided less frequently. Once again, we find insignificant differences between repurchase firms and rival firms with respect to these variables. Adding sales and capital expenditures to our regression analysis also has hardly any effect on our finding that the market reaction to guidance events is overly negative for repurchase firms compared to rival firms. Fourth, we examine guidance events during the period between first and last repurchase dates. We find similar updates and market reactions during this in-between period.
In the following section we describe how our findings in this paper connect with previous work on investor pessimism and stock repurchases. Previous theoretical work argues that repurchases are an effective method of signaling undervaluation (Ofer and Thakor 1987) , while empirical work confirms that undervaluation is a chief motivation for stock repurchases (Dittmar 2000; Brav et al. 2005; D'Mello and Shroff 2000) . Netter and Mitchell (1989) show that there was a sharp increase in repurchase activity after the October 1987 crash that was clearly related to managers' recognition of investor pessimism about stock prices. In addition, Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) show that repurchases are preceded by investor pessimism about repurchase stocks that manifests in negative excess returns during a six-month period prior to repurchase announcements and positive excess returns over four years after the announcements.
They also show that the market only partly corrects the stock price despite wide-spread calls of stock undervaluation by managers.
The remaining paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes data and methods. Section 3 reports our key tests of whether managers mislead shareholders with earnings guidance before stock repurchases.
Section 4 reports several additional (or supplemental) tests. Section 5 explains our results with reference to a large literature on stock repurchases, and Section 6 concludes.
Data, methods, and preliminary evidence
Our sample of repurchases starts with the Securities Data Company (SDC) Repurchases data, and our sample of management earnings guidance comes from the I/B/E/S Guidance data. The only other significant data used in this study include stock prices and returns from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and firm accounting data from Compustat.
Management earnings guidance data
The I/B/E/S Guidance database combines management guidance of expected firm performance originating from media sources and First Call with analyst earnings forecasts originating from I/B/E/S. There can be several reasons behind the large variation in market reaction over time, such as the difference between management guidance and analyst forecast, the relative propensity to disclose good vs. bad news, simultaneous events like earnings announcements, the time variation in earnings response coefficients of both actual news and future guidance, changes in legal framework, and investor sentiment.
While a full investigation of such reasons is beyond the scope of this paper, we point out an important implication for our study design. Given the strong time trends in market reaction and industry performance, it becomes necessary to pair every repurchase firm with an industry and size-matched firm in calendar time and contrast their experiences. Rajgopal (2011) show that firms that announce they will no longer provide earnings guidance earn an excess announcement return of -5.3%. Second, this finding also points out the existence of a simultaneous event, which is the earnings announcement. We later show that, in our sample, in nearly three-fourths of all cases managers provide earnings guidance for future periods at the same time as earnings announcements for previous periods. This makes it necessary to control for earnings surprise before making inferences about the market reaction to earnings guidance issued by repurchase firms.
Samples of repurchase firms and rival firms and search windows
Stock repurchases account for a large portion of cash returned by U.S. firms to their shareholders. The last issue in sampling concerns the identification of search windows for EPS guidance.
Recall our earlier discussion that we want to start our search window with the preceding earnings announcement date for two reasons: first, that on EAD there is actual earnings information that makes the previous guidance less relevant, and, second, that in a large majority of cases the EPS guidance is provided simultaneous with earnings announcement. We therefore identify the search windows for each pair of repurchase and rival firms as follows. For the repurchase firm, we work our way backward from the FRD to the last earnings announcement date (EAD) or the beginning of the current fiscal quarter, whichever comes later, in cases where the FRD is more than 60 days from the beginning of the current fiscal quarter. However, if the FRD is less than 60 days from the beginning of the current fiscal quarter, then we work our way back to the last EAD or the beginning of the previous fiscal quarter, whichever comes later. This date becomes the beginning date of the search window while the ending date is fixed at FRD-1. For the rival firm, we follow the same procedure to identify the beginning date of the search window, and then identify the ending date so that the search windows for the repurchase firm and the rival firm are of exactly the same length. 5 The length of the search windows thus varies across the 3,181 pairs of repurchase firms and rival firms. But our procedure ensures that in the large majority of cases 5 Our two-step procedure of identifying search window for repurchase firms is motivated by the SEC requirement that firms with a public float of $75 million release earnings within 35 days of a fiscal quarter-end or 60 days of a fiscal year-end. We find that 97% of our sample firms have market value of equity exceeding $75 million, which is a proxy for public float. This explains why we stop our search within the current (previous) quarter if FRD is greater (less) than 60 days from the beginning of the current quarter. Sometimes an earnings announcement date is missing from data, which is why we stop the backward search with the beginning of the current or the previous quarter as appropriate. As a practical matter, in 3,027 (3,070) cases the search window for repurchase (rival) firm starts exactly with the last earnings announcement date. Further, in 101 (61) cases the window starts with the beginning of current fiscal quarter, and in 53 (50) cases it starts with the beginning of the last fiscal quarter.
(over 95%), the search windows for both repurchase firms and rival firms begin with the previous EAD
and are approximately matched in calendar time. As robustness check, we later report our results with a fixed 30-day window before FRD that is employed by Brockman, Khurana, and Martin (2008).
Sample description
Panel A of Table 3 That does not appear to be a sufficient incentive considering the costs of misguidance. The last row in
Panel B of Table 3 shows that firms adopt different repurchase techniques, but open market repurchases are dominant accounting for 2,859, or 90%, of all cases. Tender offers are rare, in 34 cases, Dutch auction repurchases are only slightly more numerous, in 84 cases, and all other techniques (such as "Accelerated", "Negotiated", and "Odd lot") account for the remaining 206 cases. It can be argued that each technique offers some incentive to push down the stock price, so we retain all of them. is explained by differences in firm characteristics. Looking further, rival firms that provide earnings guidance do so 1.278 times per event, which exceeds 1.209 times per event for repurchase firms. As a result, the total number of guidance dates at 2,178 for repurchase firms and 2,163 for rival firms are a virtual tie. Further, repurchase firms provide earnings guidance for future periods at the same time as an actual earnings announcement in 77.2% of these cases, which is significantly more often than rival firms at 72.5%. Alternately, 473 rival firms provide earnings guidance on at least one date other than an earnings announcement, which is significantly more than 398 repurchase firms that do the same. Thus, even though a higher number of repurchase firms provide earnings guidance, they are more likely than rival firms to issue guidance only once and to do so at the time of an earnings announcement. This paints a picture of greater restraint in their guidance policy.
Summary statistics of repurchase firms and rival firms
Panel B of Table 4 compares many firm characteristics of repurchase firms and rival firms.
Despite our attempts at industry and size matching, repurchase firms tend to be somewhat bigger, with a mean (median) market value of equity of $8,049 ($1,661) million. That compares with a mean (median) market value of $6,492 ($1,587) million for rival firms. Repurchase firms also have similar market-tobook ratio, but higher return on equity compared to rival firms. The earnings surprise during the guidance quarter is similar for both groups of firms. However, the prior market-adjusted excess return over a 90-day window ending two days before the start of search window equals -1.24% for repurchase firms and -0.04% for rival firms. The difference is statistically significant, pointing to the general pessimism surrounding repurchase firms over an extended period. Finally, repurchase firms have lower risk measured by the standard deviation of prior daily returns, but comparable beta to rival firms. The calculation of all these variables is described in the legend of Table 4 .
Regression tests of the guidance frequency
In Table 5 , we report a few logistic model tests of the inclination of the managers of repurchase firms vs. rival firms to provide earnings guidance. In Models (5.1) and (5.2), the dependent variable equals one if a firm had one or more MGDs during the pre-FRD search window at any time, and zero otherwise. The sample starts with 3,181 repurchase firms and 3,181 rival firms, for a total of 6,362 firms.
It reduces to 6,015 firms in multivariate tests that include six control variables for which data are not available in some cases. The main variable of interest is a Repurchase dummy, which equals one for repurchase firms and zero for rival firms in this pre-FRD experiment. The control variables include firm characteristics that may be related to the decision to provide guidance as follows: log market value of equity (because large firms are followed by more analysts and investors who care about guidance), market-to-book ratio (because earnings surprises for growth firms have a proportionally higher price impact and increase the need for guidance), return on equity (because more profitable firms attract more analysts and investors), earnings surprise during the contemporaneous or last earnings announcement (because higher earnings increase the need to communicate whether the trend will continue), prior return over a 90-day period (because declining prices may increase the need for guidance), and standard deviation of prior returns (because higher uncertainty makes it difficult to provide useful guidance).
Model (5.1) presents univariate logistic results that are similar to the chi-square results in Table 4 .
It shows that repurchase firms are more likely to issue guidance than rival firms. However, Model (5.2) presents multivariate logistic results in which the Repurchase dummy becomes insignificant. Among control variables, the coefficients of log market value of equity, market-to-book ratio, and earnings surprise are positive while the coefficient of the standard deviation of prior returns is negative, in each case consistent with the conjectured reason for its inclusion. The coefficients of return on equity and prior return are insignificant.
7 Models (5.3) and (5.4) in Table 5 employ a slightly different dependent variable that equals one if a firm had one or more MGDs during the pre-FRD search window that did not coincide with an earnings announcement, and zero otherwise. In these models, the Repurchase dummy is significantly negative in both univariate and multivariate settings. The combined evidence of Table 5 suggests that the managers of repurchase firms are not necessarily more inclined to provide earnings guidance than the managers of rival firms. In addition, they are less inclined to provide such guidance at times other than an earnings announcement. This evidence is not in the same spirit as previous literature which suggests that managers actively mislead investors by painting a gloomy picture of firm prospects before repurchases. Of course, a complete review requires looking at the information conveyed by the guidance and whether that information is downward biased relative to the actual earnings for the periods covered by the guidance. 
Main results
In this section we describe our main results related to the magnitude of EPS guidance for repurchase firms vs. rival firms, the market reaction to guidance events, and the unbiasedness of such voluntary disclosure as judged by the difference between the guidance and subsequent actual earnings.
The entire analysis is carried out over the pre-FRD search window.
Information content of EPS guidance during the pre-FRD search window
Panel A of Table 6 shows some evidence that, on average, repurchase firms provide more negative annual EPS guidance than rival firms. This may be either because they have more negative news or because they paint an overly negative picture. We attempt to disentangle these two explanations in subsequent tests.
The mean and median tests show that the annual EPS update for repurchase firms is on the order of 0.01% to 0.05% lower than for rival firms (regardless of statistical significance), so we can choose 0.03% for a representative estimate. That amounts to 1.2 cents for a $40 stock price. The likely price effects of such difference would depend on a "guidance response coefficient (GRC)", similar to an "earnings response coefficient (ERC)", and equal to the coefficient of annual EPS update in a regression of announcement excess returns. We address this question after presenting regression analysis in Table 8 .
Panel B.2 of Table 6 extends the above analysis to quarterly EPS guidance. Individually, the aggregated quarterly EPS updates for both repurchase firms and rival firms are significantly negative, similar to the evidence for the entire guidance database presented in Table 2 . However, the differences between mean and median values of the aggregated quarterly EPS updates for repurchase firms and rival firms are relatively small and statistically insignificant. 9 We should clarify a slight difference in terminology and the associated concept with regard to EPS updates. The terms "total annual EPS update" and "total quarterly EPS update" are employed in Tables 2, 7 , 8, and 11. These quantities are calculated by summing up the EPS updates over all annual (or quarterly) periods covered as part of one disclosure made on one MGD (management guidance date). This procedure is appropriate whenever the focus is on market returns. In comparison, the terms "aggregated annual EPS update" and "aggregated quarterly EPS update" are employed in Tables 6 and 10 . These latter quantities are calculated by summing up EPS updates over all annual (or quarterly) periods covered during one search window that may contain one or more MGDs. This latter procedure is appropriate whenever the focus is on aggregate disclosure made during one repurchase program. Panel B of Table 7 shows that the mean CAR calculated for 867 bad news MGDs for repurchase firms is -4.00% while the mean CAR for 768 bad news MGDs for rival firms is -2.00%, amounting to a difference between mean CARs of -2.00% (p-value 0.000). The corresponding differences for good news and mixed news MGDs are -0.84% (p-value 0.027) and -1.19% (p-value 0.099). We find similar evidence in Panel C of Table 7 , which reports CARs for the minority sample of MGDs that do not coincide with an EAD. Regardless of the type of news, the market reaction to MGDs for repurchase firms is more pessimistic than for rival firms. The difference varies across subsamples, but seems to be on the order of one and a half percent in univariate comparisons. We include similar nonlinear terms to capture the relation between CAR and annual and quarterly EPS updates as well.
Market reaction to earnings guidance during the pre-FRD search window
Model ( The higher coefficient of quarterly update is not surprising as a one-cent change in quarterly earnings implies a greater change in stock price than a one-cent change in annual earnings if a part of the change is expected to be permanent. The nonlinear terms are all negative, consistent with an S-shaped pattern, and statistically significant in two out of three cases. Finally, following Subramanyam and Wild (1996) and Wilson (2008) , Model (7.4) includes additional control variables of predict, persist, market-to-book, beta, log market value of equity, and loss dummy (defined in the conclude that the market is unreasonably pessimistic about the prospects of repurchase firms relative to industry and size matched rival firms. Such pessimism leads to bargain prices and feeds into the repurchase decisions of managers who are interested in maximizing their long-term stock price. 10 We note that the coefficients of control variables are reasonably similar and stable across all seven models, which adds credibility to our results. Finally, note that the annual guidance response coefficient varies between 3 and 6 in different regressions of Table 8 . This suggests that minor differences in annual EPS updates for repurchase firms and rival firms documented in Section 3.1 of around 0.03% explain only a minor part of the difference between their CARs, somewhere between 3×0.03 = 0.09% and 6×0.03 = 0.18%. That is why the Repurchase dummy is relatively robust to the inclusion of different control variables.
Bias and accuracy of EPS guidance of repurchase firms and rival firms
If earnings guidance provided by repurchase firms unduly understates the actual earnings relative to guidance provided by rival firms, they could still be accused of misleading investors. We measure the bias in management guidance as the EPS guidance minus the actual earnings, divided by the stock price as of MGD-2 and multiplied by 100. We measure the accuracy of guidance by the absolute value of bias. This is an inverse measure, the lower the absolute difference between the EPS guidance and actual earnings, the more accurate the guidance. We measure both bias and accuracy for the earliest quarter 10 One may ask whether price decreases of the order of one and a half percent create a sufficient incentive to accomplish a repurchase. We address this issue as follows. There are many known reasons for repurchases, such as returning cash to shareholders in a tax-efficient form, reducing agency costs of free cash, and altering the capital structure. Stock undervaluation is an important reason, but not in every case. We have shown one source of undervaluation, which is the three-day market reaction to management guidance. There may be other sources of undervaluation, such as the average -1.24% excess returns over a prior 90-day window as shown in Table 3 .
covered by management guidance. On average, the earnings announcement date for this earliest quarter occurs 60 days after FRD. There are several reasons for this choice. First, guidance for farther-out periods is necessarily less accurate, so analysts and investors may attach relatively less importance to it. Second, the actual EPS for the farther-out periods will be affected by subsequent events, including the actual EPS for the earlier periods that we analyze. Third, the ongoing repurchases themselves affect the actual EPS in an unpredictable manner, depending on the price-to-earnings ratio and interest rates during the intervening period as modeled by Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006) . This reason also favors examining the nearest period covered by the guidance.
Panel A of Table 9 shows the univariate statistics for bias and accuracy of management guidance.
The sample includes 962 repurchase firms and 921 rival firms, which is 98% of all firms that provide some quarterly EPS guidance. The mean and median values of bias equal -0.068% and -0.067% for repurchase firms, and -0.085% and -0.073% for rival firms. All estimates are significant with a p-value of 0.000. However, the differences between mean and median values of bias for repurchase firms and rival firms are insignificant. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that, on average, the managers of both repurchase firms and rival firms are equally conservative in their guidance. In addition, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are equally accurate in their forecasts. Specifically, the mean and median accuracy as inverse-measured by the absolute value of difference between guidance and earnings equals 0.223% and 0.116% for repurchase firms, and 0.243% and 0.114% for rival firms. The differences between means and medians across the two groups of firms are again insignificant.
Panel B of Table 9 reports a multivariate analysis of bias and accuracy of guidance. The key independent variable continues to be the Repurchase dummy. We use the same set of control variables for bias and accuracy, based on Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta (2005) and Brockman, Khurana, and Martin (2008) . These control variables include log market value of equity, market-to-book ratio, a litigation dummy, a loss dummy, and earnings volatility (defined in the table). The regressions do not change our univariate evidence, that the bias and accuracy of earnings guidance provided by the managers of repurchase firms are statistically indistinguishable from those provided by the managers of rival firms.
The combined evidence of Tables 6 to 9 is inconsistent with the notion that managers of repurchase firms purposely mislead their investors into selling their stock to the firm for too cheap. The earnings guidance provided by repurchase firms is only marginally lower than that provided by rival firms in some of the tests. Yet, the market reacts unduly negatively to such guidance. The managers of negative-reaction firms may be responding rationally by repurchasing some of their outstanding shares to distribute their surplus cash to short-term departing shareholders while increasing their long-term stock price to the benefit of sustaining long-term shareholders and themselves. Our evidence is inconsistent with Brockman, Khurana, and Martin (2008), who attribute the excessively negative returns following management guidance events to the managers' deliberate plans to mislead the market. We note that they also report two-stage regression tests of endogeneity to conclude that the repurchase decision causes the negative management guidance and not vice versa. However, Larcker and Rusticus (2010) point out many limitations of such instrumental variables techniques in typical research settings. Since we use EPS updates and not stock market reactions to measure news content of guidance, our tests are not subject to the same endogeneity concerns. 
Additional tests

Comparing EPS guidance and market reaction post-LRD (last repurchase date) and pre-FRD (first repurchase date)
If managers mislead investors into selling their stock for cheap with downward biased guidance pre-FRD, perhaps to increase the value of their own stock holding or stock-based compensation, then they may also issue upward biased guidance post-LRD to further increase the stock price. In any case, they would have no continued incentive to issue downward biased guidance post-LRD. Thus, the post-LRD earnings guidance becomes an important benchmark to infer the potential bias in the pre-FRD guidance.
11 In another paper on the same topic, Chen and Huang (2013) argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 reduced managers' incentives to manage earnings prior to repurchases. Since our dataset containing both earnings guidance and the prevailing analyst forecasts starts in 2003, we cannot measure the parallel effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on managers' incentives to mislead investors with biased earnings forecasts. However, we have shown that following the methodology of Brockman, Khurana, and Martin (2008), many of our results would have affirmed their evidence in favor of misguidance even during the post Sarbanes-Oxley period. Our main contribution lies in using a superior dataset and methodology to show that such evidence is explained by endogeneity regardless of the period of study.
We define the post-LRD window for examining earnings guidance as follows. For each repurchase firm, we identify the ending date of the window as the first EAD after LRD or the end of next quarter, whichever comes first. Ending the window this way is a natural choice as the majority of MGDs coincide with an EAD. The starting date of the window is LRD+1. Next, for each rival firm, we identify the ending date the same way, and work backwards to identify the starting date such that the post-LRD search windows for the repurchase firm and the rival firm are of the same length. Table 10 presents two sets of comparisons using select measures introduced earlier in Tables Table 4 . Notice that 1,802 repurchase firms provide guidance during the pre-FRD window, so the difference in their frequencies pre-FRD and post-LRD is insignificant.
Looking further, Panel B of Table 10 shows that the aggregated annual EPS updates during a search window for post-LRD repurchase firms are comparable to that for post-LRD rival firms as well as pre-FRD repurchase firms. Further, the aggregated quarterly EPS updates for post-LRD repurchase firms are, in fact, lower than for both post-LRD rival firms and pre-FRD repurchase firms. The quarterly evidence goes against the manipulation story, which suggests that the managers are interested in a higher stock price after the end of a repurchase program. We infer that the decision to start or stop repurchasing was not related to the news content measured by the earnings updates. Perhaps the answer lies in the changed market reaction to earnings guidance for repurchase firms and rival firms from what we saw during the pre-FRD period. We next explore this possibility.
Panel C of Table 10 shows that mean CAR for all MGDs during the post-LRD window equals 0.34% for repurchase firms and 0.30% for rival firms, insignificantly different from each other, despite some evidence in Panel B that the updates are overall more negative for repurchase firms. In addition, mean CAR for the post-LRD repurchase firms is 1.49% higher than pre-FRD repurchase firms, which is significant at 1% level. This suggests that the negative market reaction to repurchase firms dissipates after the repurchase. We explore this issue further in multivariate CAR regressions shown in Table 11 . Our focus is again on the Repurchase dummy that takes the value of one for repurchase firms and zero for rival firms in this post-LRD analysis. The coefficient of this dummy variable is positive in five regressions, negative in two, and insignificant in all seven cases. This post-LRD evidence contrasts with the pre-FRD evidence in Table 8 , which showed that the coefficient of the Repurchase dummy variable is always significantly negative. This finding further strengthens our belief that the market overreacts to negative information in the pre-FRD period and that this misreaction feeds into the repurchase decision.
Evidence based on a fixed 30-day pre-FRD search window
As discussed before, the last EAD before an FRD is the natural place where to begin the pre-FRD search window. As a robustness check, however, we repeat our experiment using a fixed 30-day window before FRD for both repurchase firms and rival firms. On average, this window is 19 days shorter than the window examined in the main tests of this paper, although in some cases it can be longer. Still, we are left with 972 MGDs for repurchase firms and 919 MGDs for rival firms, representing 893 unique repurchase firms and 847 unique rival firms. The evidence on annual and quarterly EPS updates for this muchreduced sample of guidance is similar to that for the main sample of this paper. However, the evidence on market misreaction to earnings guidance provided by repurchase firms is somewhat stronger. In the aggregate sample of all MGDs, the market-adjusted excess return for repurchase firms is 2.01% lower than that for rival firms (t-statistic 4.98, p-value 0.000). The corresponding difference for the main sample of this paper is 1.45% in Table 6 (t-statistic 5.99, p-value 0.000). There is considerable overlap between the two samples, so we do not report tests of the difference between differences. Overall, our conclusions in this paper are not sensitive to the definition of the pre-FRD search window.
Evidence based on other components of management guidance: Sales and capital expenditure
Our analysis thus far has been focused on the earnings part of management guidance. We discussed several reasons for this choice in Section 2.1, in particular, that EPS summarizes the effects of other accounting items and determines the stock price. However, two other accounting items are frequently included in management guidance: sales and capital expenditure (capex). So for completeness we present statistics on sales and capex updates during the pre-FRD search window for repurchase firms and rival firms in Table 12 . We define aggregated annual sales update, aggregated annual capex update, aggregated quarterly sales update, and aggregated quarterly capex update in a parallel manner to aggregated annual EPS update and aggregated quarterly EPS update that were presented in Table 6 .
While detailed information is best absorbed from Table 12 , none of the differences between the mean values of the four new statistics for repurchase firms and rival firms are statistically significant.
Further, in untabulated results, we expand the pre-FRD regression analysis of market reaction to MGDs in Table 8 by including relevant statistics for sales and capex updates. This does not change any of our conclusions. In multivariate models (8.2) to (8.4) that includes three-fourths of the total sample, the coefficient of Repurchase dummy changes by only between 0.01% and 0.05%.
Earnings guidance during the period between FRD and LRD (first and last repurchase dates)
Open market repurchases are long drawn-out programs, averaging 463 days (1.27 years) between FRD and LRD. This period may consist of multiple repurchase segments. In most cases these segments are adjacent to each other, but in a few cases may be separated by periods of inactivity. We find that out of 3,181 matched pairs of firms in our sample, 1,988 repurchase firms and 1,896 rival firms provide earnings guidance at least once but possibly multiple times (average 6.5 times) during this period. Since the in-between MGDs occur after some repurchase activity and before other repurchase activity, the directional incentives of managers under the alternate hypothesis that they mislead investors before stock repurchases are not clear. Still, for completion, we examine the information content of earnings guidance and the accompanying market reactions during the in-between periods. We find that all basic variables analyzed before in this study are of similar magnitudes for the two groups of firms. Specifically, the annual updates average -0.057% and -0.067% for the repurchase firms and rival firms (insignificantly different), the quarterly updates average -0.123% and -0.149% (significantly less negative for repurchase firms in statistical terms, but by a small amount), and the excess returns average 0.134% and 0.188%
(insignificantly different). Overall, we find no evidence of a systematic difference between the disclosure practices of repurchase firms and rival firms between FRD and LRD.
Explaining our results: Investor pessimism and stock repurchases
In this paper we have shown that investors react unduly negatively to earnings guidance before stock repurchases. It is relatively easy to argue why the resulting underpricing may cause managers to repurchase their stock by making the following assumptions: 1. Market reaction to any corporate announcement is necessarily noisy, consisting of a true change in valuation component, , and a noise component, . 2. Managers possess more accurate information than outside investors and can assess whether is positive or negative. 3. Managers are motivated to increase the long-term value of their firms to the benefit of their long-term shareholders, which also includes them as they do not participate in share repurchases. It follows that managers will be more likely to repurchase shares following unduly negative market reaction to their earnings guidance.
Netter and Mitchell (1989) were undervalued or overvalued relative to the risk-adjusted relationship with the market." It should therefore come as no surprise that in the firm-specific setting of our paper the managers are able to detect and act upon the excessively negative market reaction to their stocks following their earnings guidance.
Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) test a version of the overreaction hypothesis, according to which repurchases are driven by the fact that the management believes the market has overreacted to some publicly available information in the recent past. Consistent with this overreaction hypothesis, they find strong evidence of negative stock returns over several months leading to the repurchase announcement.
The average prior 6-month excess return is a highly significant -9.05% for their aggregate sample of firms Thakor show that small undervaluation will be rectified with dividends while managers that perceive a relatively large undervaluation will undertake stock repurchases. Fourth, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Chan et al. (2010) present a "cheap talk" hypothesis according to which managers of some firms announce repurchases to prop up their sagging stock prices. Such managers do not follow up on these announcements with actual repurchases, which interestingly does not fool the investors. While cheap talk may also be regarded as manipulative, it is in a direction opposite to that implied by Brockman, Khurana, and Martin (2008) and Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008) . More importantly, their evidence shows that the investors are not easily fooled. Finally, our evidence based on the actual news content of earnings guidance provided by managers also suggests that investors undervalue repurchase stocks and ties in with a large literature that suggests the same.
Conclusion
Previous research suggests that managers release overly negative information before stock repurchases in order to buy back stock cheaply, thereby transferring wealth from the selling shareholders to the surviving long-term shareholders. In this paper, we point out several methodological concerns with past evidence. Foremost, previous evidence in favor of management misguidance rests primarily on stock market reactions to earnings guidance announcements. We show that these stock market reactions suffer from endogeneity and are biased measures of the information content of management guidance.
We directly measure the information content of management guidance as the difference between the EPS (earnings per share) number provided by the managers and the prevailing analyst consensus estimate, all scaled by the stock price. We compare EPS guidance for 3,181 repurchase firms during 2003 to 2012 with similar guidance for an industry and size matched sample of 3,181 rival firms. We find that repurchase firms and rival firms have similar frequency of EPS guidance. Moreover, there is no significant difference between the earnings updates implied by the management guidance for repurchase firms and rival firms. We also examine the difference between the earnings guidance and the corresponding actual earnings announced at a later date for repurchase firms and rival firms. This difference is negative for both sets of firms, but it is not statistically different across repurchase firms and rival firms. That is, both repurchase firms and rival firms present an equally conservative future outlook.
Our tests do not uncover any evidence that repurchasing firms attempt to mislead the market through the release of overly negative information ahead of stock repurchases.
On the other hand, we consistently find that despite similar information content of guidance issued by repurchase firms and rival firms prior to repurchase, the stock market reacts significantly more negatively to guidance provided by repurchase firms than to guidance provided by rival firms. This evidence holds up in several tests after controlling for differences in future earnings updates implied by the management guidance as well as the surprise part of the simultaneous announcement of last quarter's earnings (where applicable). It is consistent with previous literature which shows that the market holds pessimistic views about repurchase firms in general, and it highlights the endogeneity problems inherent in using stock market reactions as proxies of the information content of management guidance. In summary, our evidence suggests that managers do not mislead investors before stock repurchases, instead they take advantage of depressed stock prices to the benefit of long-term shareholders. Table 1 Yearly distribution of management earnings guidance data and market reactions
We start with the original I/B/E/S Guidance database and examine management guidance issued between 1993 and 2012. We retain only guidance issued for earnings per share (EPS). There are 124,467 EPS guidance issued, both annual and quarterly included. These 124,467 guidance observations collapse to 88,855 unique firm-MGDs (management guidance dates). Thus, in many cases, managements issue guidance for multiple years and quarters on the same day. From these, we retain 85,144 MGDs for which the cumulative excess (or abnormal) returns (CARs) can be calculated from the CRSP database. The CARs are calculated over a three-day period centered on the MGD, and equal the sum of the differences between the stock return and the value-weighted market return on each day. Table 2 Yearly distribution of mean updates to annual and quarterly EPS implied by management guidance
The initial sample of 85,144 firm-MGDs between 1993 and 2012 which includes guidance for EPS and for which the cumulative excess returns (CARs) can be calculated is described in Table 1. In this table, we further subset this sample  to 60,015 observations between 2003 and 2012 for which the prevailing analyst consensus estimate is available. We calculate the updates to annual and quarterly EPS as the difference between the EPS guidance and the analyst consensus estimate, divided by the closing stock price on MGD-2 and multiplied by 100. In cases where the EPS guidance is given as a range of values, we use the range midpoint. We winsorize the annual and quarterly update variables at the 1% and 99% levels in the aggregate sample included in this table. Finally, if there are multiple annual or quarterly periods included on one MGD, we separately sum the updates to calculate the total annual update and the total quarterly update. Net percent positive frequency is calculated as the difference between percent positive and percent negative frequencies. The percent zero frequency ranges between 1% and 6% for annual updates and 1% and 11% for quarterly updates during different years and does not enter the calculation of net percent positive frequency. Table 3 Sample of repurchase events
We begin with 6,130 repurchases from SDC Platinum with non-missing FRD (first repurchase date) between May 2003 and December 2012. From these, we retain 3,222 repurchase firms that appear at least once in the I/B/E/S Guidance database. We next subset to 3,211 repurchase firms that have contemporaneous information in the CRSP and Compustat files. We match each repurchase firm with a rival firm using the procedure described in Table 4 , which gives a final sample of 3,181 repurchase programs or events. Most sample statistics given below are obtained from SDC, but the earnings announcement dates are retrieved from Compustat. Table 4 Summary statistics of repurchase firms and rival firms
The sample of 3,181 repurchase events is described in Table 3 . To identify a rival firm for each event, we start with the sample of all CRSP and Compustat firms that appear at least once in the Guidance database and do not initiate a repurchase of their own from one year before to one year after the FRD of the repurchase firm. We first look for a rival firm with the same 4-digit SIC code and closest in size (market value of equity) provided the size is not less than half or more than twice of the size of the repurchase firm. If no firm meets this requirement, then we look for a 3-digit SIC match and use the same size criteria. If we are still unable to match, then we look for a 2-digit SIC match but without the size restriction. 2,493 repurchase firms are matched at the 4-digit SIC level, 269 at the 3-digit SIC level, and 419 at the 2-digit level. We next identify the search windows for EPS guidance for each pair of repurchase and rival firms as follows. For the repurchase firm we work our way backward from the FRD to the last earnings announcement date (EAD) or the beginning of the fiscal quarter, whichever comes later, in cases where the FRD is more than 60 days from the beginning of the fiscal quarter. However, if the FRD is less than 60 days from the beginning of the fiscal quarter, then we work our way back to the last EAD or the beginning of the previous fiscal quarter, whichever comes later. This date becomes the beginning date of the search window while the ending date is FRD-1. For the rival firm, we follow the same procedure to identify the beginning date of the search window, and then identify the ending date so that the search windows for the repurchase firm and the rival firm are of exactly the same length. We calculate the market value of equity using Compustat data as of the previous year-end. The market-to-book ratio equals the sum of market value of equity, total long-term debt, and debt in current liabilities, all divided by total assets. The return on equity equals the net income for the previous year divided by the book value of equity. We further calculate prior return over a 90-day period ending 2 days before starting date of the search window as the sum of the daily differences between the stock return and the market return. The standard deviation of prior returns is calculated using the same daily differences between returns. The stock beta is calculated using daily stock and market returns over a 250-day period ending 2 days before the starting date of the search window. The earnings surprise equals the actual earnings per share minus the most recent analyst consensus estimate, divided by the stock price and multiplied by 100, computed for the last reported earnings announcement before repurchase. The stock price for scaling is as of MGD-2 days if there is guidance, otherwise as of the quarter-end preceding the earnings announcement date. The following variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels in the combined sample of repurchase firms and rival firms throughout this paper: percent shares repurchased, market value of equity, return on equity, market to book ratio, earnings surprise, and prior return over a 90-day window. Statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels is highlighted by * and ** . Table 5 Multivariate analysis of whether repurchasing firms are more likely than rival firms to provide EPS guidance during the pre-FRD search window
The sample includes 3,181 repurchase firms and 3,181 rival firms selected using the industry and size matching procedure listed in Table 3 . Models (5.1) and (5.2) report logit analysis of a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm reports one or more MGDs during its pre-FRD (first repurchase date) search window at any time, and zero otherwise. Models (5.3) and (5.4) impose the further restriction that the dummy variable equals one only if there is at least one MGD that does not coincide with an EAD. The key independent variable is the Repurchase dummy, which equals one for repurchase firms and zero for rival firms in this pre-FRD analysis. The control variables of market value of equity, market-to-book ratio, return on equity, earnings surprise, prior returns over a 90-day period, and standard deviation of prior return are also defined in Table 6 Comparing the magnitudes of EPS guidance from repurchase firms and rival firms during the pre-FRD search window
The sample includes 3,181 repurchase firms and 3,181 rival firms selected using the industry and size matching procedure described in Table 4 . This table analyzes the magnitude of EPS information related to annual or quarterly periods covered by one or more MGDs during the pre-FRD (first repurchase date) search window. Table 2 . Second, we classify an MGD as a good-news (bad-news) event if both total annual update and total quarterly update are non-missing and greater than (less than) zero, or if one of them is zero or missing and the other is greater than (less than) zero. Third, the remaining cases that are not unambiguously good-news or bad-news events are classified as mixed-news events. Next, we measure the marketadjusted excess return (CAR) as the sum of market-adjusted stock return each day over a three-day period centered on the MGD. The market return is measured by the CRSP value-weighted return including dividend (VWRETD Table 7 . The dependent variable in all regressions is CAR, or the market-adjusted excess return expressed in percent. This excess return is calculated as the sum of market-adjusted stock return each day over a three-day period centered on the MGD. The market return is measured by the CRSP value-weighted return including dividend (VWRETD). The sample in this table starts with the sample of Table 7 , but it is reduced in various regressions depending on the availability of independent variables. The key independent variable is the Repurchase dummy, which equals one for repurchase firms and zero for rival firms. The key control variables include the total annual update and the total quarterly update as defined in Tables 2 and 7 Subramanyam and Wild (1996) , and Wilson (2008), we introduce nonlinear transforms of earnings surprise, total annual update, and total quarterly update as {variable × Abs (variable)}. Based on the latter two papers, we also include additional control variables of predict, persist, market-to-book, beta, log market value of equity, loss dummy, and the interactions of each variable with earnings surprise in Model (8.4). Predict is calculated as the standard deviation of earnings surprise over the 20 quarters preceding the current quarter (reduced to not less than eight if data are not available). Persist is the autocorrelation in earnings surprise series. Loss dummy equals one if current earnings are negative, and zero otherwise. The calculation of market-to-book, beta, and market value of equity is described in Bias and accuracy of EPS guidance of repurchase firms and rival firms during the pre-FRD search window
The sample in this table starts with 981 repurchase firms and 940 rival firms identified in Table 6 for which there is at least one MGD during the pre-FRD window that contains a quarterly EPS guidance. The requirement of actual earnings and the control variables reduces the sample a little as shown below. For each pre-FRD search window we identify the earliest quarter for which EPS guidance is provided. For this period we calculate the bias as the EPS guidance minus the actual earnings, divided by the stock price as of MGD-2 and multiplied by 100. The actual earnings are obtained from the I/B/E/S database. The bias is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels in the combined sample of repurchase firms and rival firms. The accuracy of EPS forecast is inverse-measured by the absolute value of bias. In Panel A, the p-values of mean and difference between means are calculated using the t-test, the p-value of median is calculated using the binomial test, and the p-value of difference between medians is calculated using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. In Panel B, the key independent variable is the Repurchase dummy, which equals one for repurchase firms and zero for rival firms. We calculate the market value of equity using Compustat data as of the previous year-end. The market-to-book ratio equals the sum of market value of equity, total long-term debt, and debt in current liabilities, all divided by total assets. The litigation dummy equals one for firms in biotechnology (Compustat SIC 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computer (3570-3577 and 7370-7374) , electronics (3600-3674), and retail (5200-5961), and zero otherwise. This table presents a few assorted statistics on the frequency and magnitude of EPS guidance in Panel A, and market reaction to EPS guidance in Panel B. The focus is on the post-LRD window, which is defined as follows. For each repurchase firm, we identify the ending date of the window as the first EAD (earnings announcement date) after LRD or the end of next quarter, whichever comes first. The starting date of window is LRD+1. Next, for each rival firm, we identify the ending date the same way, and work backwards to identify the starting date such that the post-LRD search windows for the repurchase firm and the rival firm are of the same length. All variables analyzed in this table have been defined before in Tables 6 and 7 . The repurchase firms post-LRD are compared two ways, first with rival firms post-LRD, and second with repurchase firms pre-FRD. Figures in square parentheses are the sample sizes. In Panel A, the p-values of mean and difference between means are calculated using the t-test, the p-value of median is calculated using the binomial test, and the p-value of difference between medians is calculated using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. Figures in round parentheses represent the p-values corresponding to matched-pairs differences. Statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels is highlighted by * and Table 11 Multivariate analysis of the market-adjusted excess returns to MGDs during the post-LRD (last repurchase date) search window This table is similar to Table 8 , except that it presents regression analysis of CARs surrounding MGDs during the post-LRD search window whereas Table 8 presented the parallel analysis during the pre-FRD search window. The post-LRD window is identified as described in Table 10 . The calculation of independent variables is described in Tables 8 and 10 . The key independent variable is the Repurchase dummy, which equals one for repurchase firms and zero for rival firms in this post-LRD analysis. Figures in parentheses represent Table 12 Comparing the information content of sales and capital expenditure (capex) guidance from repurchase firms and rival firms during the pre-FRD search window
The sample includes 3,181 repurchase firms and 3,181 rival firms selected using the industry and size matching procedure described in Tables 3 and 4. This table compares 
